

Notes on Remarks of Robert Amory, Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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1. Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), told members of the Clandestine Services Review class in Building [REDACTED] on 27 September that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in January 1961 will be the Director in February 1961. Mr. Amory's statement was in answer to a question on how CIA might be affected if there were a change in U.S. Government administration after January 1961. Mr. Amory said further that through the efforts of Director Allen Dulles, CIA has been able to achieve a strictly impartial, apolitical status and that though the Director is appointed by the President of the United States, and therefore theoretically the office is subject to change with a change of administration, actually it is improbable that such a change will be made. He added that in 1956, when the Director of the Budget sent letters to all ambassadors and other Presidential appointees requesting their resignations, he also sent a letter to the DCI, who returned it with a note saying that the letter must have been sent to him by mistake.
2. In response to a question on CIA relations with Congress, Mr. Amory said that some are good, some bad. The Director prefers to deal with established committees which now have experienced men than with one new committee which might attract the more irresponsible congressman who would like nothing better than to meddle in CIA internal affairs. Congressmen are appropriately informed of CIA activities. Paul Kildea, chairman of a new subcommittee on Intelligence composed of 3 Republicans and 4 or 5 Democrats, has been briefed extensively. Congressmen have been 100 percent secure on agency matters and for the most part are friendly and understanding. Circumstances occasionally cause strains: for example, by Presidential directive, CIA was not authorized to disclose U-2 information to congress, and as a result some members of Congress were irked. The Director, however, is a much-sought-after witness for Congressional committees because he has proved to be a reliable civil servant, not subject to policy biases or political pressures.
3. Other questions and Mr. Amory's answers were as follows:
  - a. "How do you weigh intelligence gathered through clandestine sources against that gathered overtly?" Mr. Amory said that quantitatively, one-fifth to one-sixth of the significant reporting originates from the Clandestine Services, and that qualitatively, the proportion is even higher. A study of the daily review of the Office of Current Intelligence made according to the origin of items used gave the following percentages:

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|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| Foreign Service Dispatches and Cables | 30 percent       |
| Clandestine Services Reports          | 17 to 19 percent |
| NSA Intercepts                        | 17 to 19 percent |
| Exact figure unknown: less than       | 17 percent       |
| Military Attache Reports              | 4 percent        |

On Soviet Bloc intelligence, information from the Clandestine Services formed 38 percent of material used in the OCI daily. No one intelligence service could do all the collecting nor could any one be abolished. The policy in the DD(I) is to make the most of each service for what it can contribute. He thinks that it is important that CIA personnel have close relationships in the field with other intelligence services.

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- b. "We, in the field [REDACTED], thought that we had fairly well covered the [REDACTED]. In fact, our cable lines were flooded for several weeks prior to the event with information reports forecasting what was to come. In spite of this, after the event it appeared as though in the national view we had been caught napping. What happened? Was the National Security Council (NSC) informed?" Mr. Amory answered that it was known that there was a deep-seated malaise. The storm signals were up and the only surprise was that it happened as early as it did. The coup happened on Friday. At an OCB meeting on the previous Wednesday, the Director had emphasized how critical the situation was [REDACTED]
- c. "Would you care to comment on the probable effectiveness of the DEW line?" Mr. Amory answered that against a single plane, the DEW line might not be effective, but against a saturation air raid, the DEW line has met its purpose. He questioned, however, whether it might not now be considered obsolete.
- d. "How do DD(P) people arrange a tour in the DD(I)?" Mr. Amory said that the odds are high that it can be done. Between 40 and 60 persons go to the DD(P) from the DD(I) each year but the reverse flow is negligible. His personal opinion is that a case officer would be more effective if he sat back for a year or two as an analyst, but that there is not a massive amount of space in the DD(I): most of the [REDACTED] in the DD(I) are technicians or specialists. Anyone, however, from the DD(P) interested in a tour of duty assignment in the DD(I) should talk to him personally or to the Chief of Personnel of the DD(I).

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- e. "Will you explain how the USIB differs from the boards it replaces?" Mr. Amory said that the new board does not replace the IAC or the USCIB but contains all members of both boards plus two additional members: the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and the Director of the National Security Agency.
- f. "What about the situation in Cuba?" Mr. Amory said, "We did not do as well as we should have."
- g. "How do you foresee the trend in Agency operations in the next 10 to 15 years?" Mr. Amory said that our operations involve three types of countries:
  - 1) The Sino-Soviet Bloc, in which internal operations are almost impossible.
  - 2) Sophisticated friendly allies, where operations are overt or semi-covert.
  - 3) Other countries whose lack of security or ethics makes clandestine operations no great problem.

Mr. Amory thinks that there is a chance to do much more against the Bloc by technical means and that except for a recent turn for the worse in Russia, there are more openings into the Bloc. He said that we ought to have C-3 reports instead of F-6 on whether the USSR has a nuclear submarine. It is amazing what a small percentage of the CIA gross budget is targeted at our major enemy. In 15 years, we will be well in the effective satellite reconnaissance era, and infra-red will be used for early warning, resulting in a fantastic amount of information to be handled and analyzed. Analysis will take much more coordination. With literally trillions of bits of information, the reporting and analysis must be a national effort, not the work of competing services. Concerning the CRITIC system, he said that a new agency, the Defense Communications Agency, has been formed to merge the efforts of the services into one cohesive effort. Not all CRITIC messages go to the White House, but all CRITIC messages containing information not previously reported go to General Goodpaster, who decides whether the President should see them. Mr. Amory told his audience that when they are in doubt as to whether a message should be marked CRITIC, to put it on.